‘Public Art and the Art of the Public -- After the Creative City’

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Commissioned and published by ixia, the public art think tank
21st March 2012

In the last two decades, innovative forms of public art have created new dimensions to the urban landscape and played a role in the design or re-design of urban spaces. Public art has a long history, rooted in public monuments and commemorative sculpture. Today it can involve multi-media installation, digitally-enhanced performance, along with a range of social participation and multi-site cultural engagement strategies. It has developed significant intellectual capabilities and has a unique access to the politically-circumscribed realms of public culture and the political guardians of our urban-social spaces. Recent innovations in public art are the product of both endogenous and exogenous forces – it has developed as an art form (a region of contemporary art), but also developed in response to concrete non-cultural conditions (the changing socio-urban environment). Here I am interested in one dimension of the exogenous – how the concept of public art has developed in and through changing urban and cultural policy. These policy ‘contexts’ are plural, in that they are never seamless or evenly connected, despite all being driven by the ideologies that animate national public policy.

There are many ‘contextual’ conditions that have contributed to public art’s recent development (Sara Selwood’s seminal study, The Benefits of Public Art (Policy Studies Institute, 1995), registered many). An early one was in the 1980s and took the form of the Government-backed ‘Percent for Art’ scheme, which encouraged (only encouraged) local authorities and construction companies to commit funds for art at the design stage of their property development. Small as it was, the ‘Percent for Art’ concept (originally American) is now a standard reference point for public urban development around the world. The 1990s in the UK saw a growing emphasis on design in National Planning regulations, made particularly relevant by the unexpected success of the National Lottery and its prodigious investment in new buildings, cultural spaces and facilities from 1993. From 1997-2000, New
Labour’s various urban policy initiatives had a substantive cultural dimension, compelling the arts to consider its many possible social and urban applications.

In this essay I want to look at public art’s recent development in terms of, and as a response to, the developing cultural discourse on the urban environment, or more explicitly, the theme of ‘the city’. Such ‘exogenous’ forces that condition public art’s development I locate in the broad fields of urban policy and urban cultural policy. While there are many other factors we could discuss, attending to the urban function and policy appropriation of public art will allow us to broach some broad but timely questions about public art’s role in the cultural discourse of the urban environment, dominated by urban planning, design and the neighbourhood-communities agendas. Does public art have a role beyond the recent contexts of its urban and social application? I ask this in the context of current concerns about the decline of publically subsidised culture in our new age of economic scarcity.

Art and the City

By 2006, most major cities in Britain possessed a public art strategy, distinct from their arts strategy and broader cultural strategies. Cities like Bristol, Southampton, Coventry, Birmingham and Newcastle demonstrated an admirable degree of intellectual aspiration in engaging with artists, architects, urban designers and a range of public agencies in devising a plan that inserted works of art into urban development. In some cases, a strategy was supplemented by planning guidelines or commissioning guidelines, and its aims were more often than not tied to three pre-set public policy delivery routes – planning (urban environment), culture (the arts) and communities (local social populations). Given this spectrum of possible objectives, the public art strategy was inherently problematic. Some cities retained public art as part of their arts or general cultural strategy, or positioned public art within its planning-led urban regeneration strategy, where an agency or consultancy was often contracted to facilitate the strategy objectives in this area. A random but good example of public art strategy objectives as they had developed during the era of New Labour’s urban policy is perhaps Southampton’s ArtPeoplePlaces strategy of 2004. Its objectives were stated as:

- To advocate and promote the contribution of public art practice in the creation of the public realm, new building and place making that reinforces local and cultural identity;
• To secure the role of the artist within the master planning or design concept stage of all key public and private sector developments across the city;

• To encourage and support creative thinking and innovation through collaboration and the work of multi-disciplinary design teams;

• To involve local people in the planning and design of their environment and encourage a greater sense of ownership and appreciation for public spaces and buildings.¹

This example typifies expectations regarding the developing professional role of the artist; it also indicates just how embedded public art became in urban policy management regimes. It expresses a series of urban design-led objectives on the creation (or reconstitution) of new public spaces; and further, the strategy as a whole situates public art as a concept in ‘the urban’, not within mainstream arts or culture – there is little if any reference to contemporary art, culture or the broader cultural infrastructure of the city. This may seem incidental, but considering the broader cultural discourses that characterized New Labour as a policy-epoch, it remains relevant. Public art emerged from two decades of intellectual development within contexts that were not explicitly related to art history or mainstream contemporary art. The Southampton strategy is underpinned by the assumption that the ‘content’ of public art was inseparable from the objectives embodied in its urban policy contexts. Public art was not just contemporary art ‘in civic space’, but art that inhabited the broader creative processes involved in constructing an integrated urban-public realm.

Public art’s policy-generated transformation into a collaborative, generative urban practice, has shifted its axes in relation to the aspirations of mainstream contemporary art. It is now bound up with the political-policy problematic of a ‘public realm…placemaking…and cultural identity’. For many, this again can simply be framed as art ‘contributing’, by commission, to the built environment and whatever civic aspirations frame local authority planning. In many instances this is only what it is: artists are called in, at some appointed stage in the proceedings, and asked to deposit an object or other contribution to a larger strategic process of urban change.

Many of the outstanding public art strategies of city councils in the UK were published between 2002-6. Many are still standing, either because they have not been updated (in part, as they still remain useful or are still within their period of jurisdiction), or have now been submerged in the broader realms of urban development policies, like locale-specific
regeneration plans, cultural quarters or boosted cultural responsibilities of a city art gallery. What still remains is a vision of the city – a product of the New Labour-era policy imaginary – as a creative-cultural urban expanse, capable of imagination and cultural regeneration, meeting the needs of local people and the global economy alike.

This ‘vision’ of the city has its discursive roots in hybrid sources, from the historic examples of European cities and the ‘city as work of art’, to the bucolic dreams of the English Garden City tradition, to new American urban design and ‘placemaking’. The local and the global came together most effectively, however, in the now famous Creative City concept. The Creative City, concerned with artistic ‘content’ as it was, nonetheless went much further and attempt to re-cast urban policy making as a creative activity, reviving European modernist and avant-garde traditions where the act of artistic composition becomes ‘model’ for new urban planning. Thinking about public art, the Creative City is relevant on three fronts: public culture plays an emphatic role in the vision of the city within the original Creative City framework; it offers an intellectual motivation to integrate cultural policy and urban policy and planning; and the Creative City demands that the very processes of policy-strategy creation are themselves creative. However, it begs one great question – how do the radically empiricist, positivist and often civil engineering-based policy mechanisms of city authorities generate the cognitive energy and imaginative capability for ‘creativity’ in the first place? Decades of strategic management techniques and trends teaching creativity in this or that profession has not yielded what cities, with their bureaucratic traditions, have required. Creativity is not a series of cognitive techniques or ‘out of the box’ solutions to concrete problems. Creativity requires the development of a policy imagination, that is as pragmatic as it is iconoclastic, and has the power to animate the procedural mechanisms of urban governance on the level of ‘political culture’. Compromise solutions in the face of the inevitable impossibility of the Creative City revolution have of course involved commissioning public art as a visible part of piecemeal urban regeneration projects, and of course, the heavy emphasis and sponsorship of those components of the city that are creative – the creative industries sector and the arts. However, I will be suggesting that public art has more to offer in the face of the failed Creative City.

The subtitle of this paper – ‘After the Creative City’ – echoes many of the debates and informal discussions that have been taking place in the UK within the fields of urban studies and cultural policy. There is no consensus on why we are ‘after’ the creative city, other than a general acknowledgment that (i) the protracted economic crisis since 2008 (which will
probably continue as a recessionary force for the next decade) has ushered in a new regime of values, economic-instrumental values that are intrinsically hostile to ‘cultural-creative’ aspirations of any city; the problem with these values is not simply that they are inimical to the creation of a truly creative city, but that in times past we see that just those same values embed themselves so deeply in the mechanisms of economic reproduction that they can take generations to eradicate or replace; and (ii) the ‘cultural sector’ is again being ‘positioned’ in the matrix of national public policy as a marginal field of production, as essentially a dealer in luxury goods for a social elite, that is, if not commandeered into further regimes of monitoring and evaluation that ensure their cultural capital plays a central role in generating much needed social and economic capital.\(^4\) The lack of initial inclusion of the arts or culture in the new National Planning Policy Framework by the Department for Communities and Local Government, reversing two decades of planning policy development, only demonstrated the current cultural sector’s lack of political credibility.\(^5\)

This all makes for a sense of déjà vu for those who remember the Thatcher-Conservative Government’s approach to the cultural sector in the early 1980s. It was during this time that Charles Landry and Comedia developed the theory of Creative City, which was, in effect, an alternative politically inflected strategic option for the cultural sector as a whole. It attempted to re-frame the sector, positioning it within urban development, offering it another route of development than the constant national pleading of historic-national patrimony for continued public subsidy. Landry’s position was initially a compelling one. It aimed for socio-urban transformation through a wholesale policy re-orientation, where creative culture became a dynamo of urban planning, design and development. The cultural sector would no longer remain an ‘add on’ or a series of sophisticated silos for contemporary art, always marginal to the ‘real’ economy of urban life. A culture of creativity would become internal to the development of our socio-urban environments, interconnected with social communities and other public organizations on the one hand, and the market and industry on the other. In the context of the city, no radical dichotomy would exist between the publicly subsidised cultural sector and the commercial creative industries; they would both be inflections or dimensions of a broad creative-urban landscape of synergies, interdependence and interaction.

Ironically, few cities in the UK actually adopted a wholesale Creative City approach – like, for example, Toronto’s *Creative City Planning Framework* of 2008.\(^6\) Most cities maintained a medium-term ‘unitary plan’, made specific by a series of urban regeneration strategies. They may have covered every element of the city, but often every element and the relations
between them were conceptualised in more conservative functionalist planning or even civil engineering terms. Nonetheless, the Creative City ideal remained a reference point, in part by the obvious rise in popularity of ‘cultural attractions’ for a city’s visitor economy, and with it an increased measure of professional credibility for artists, art consultants and cultural organisations. They too could be internal to urban development as architects, planners and urban policy makers. But where do we stand now? The ‘Big Society’ idea of the current Conservative Party-led coalition Government may have started as a vacuous policy sound-bite and developing as a tacit rationale for a shrunken public sector – at the same time, the radical proposals for ‘localism’, devolution and ‘decentralisation’ have some measure of opportunity for developing, through practice, an alternative Big Public.\(^7\) One of the benefits of the current crisis is that the lull in capital funding and slowing of the pace of change offers some space for critical reflection on basic political commitments, values and mission, all of which, considering the last two decades, can be comfortably ignored in times of prosperity. There may not be a ‘double-dip’ recession in actual reality, but ‘realities’ in the cultural sector are as much about policy-makers’ perceptions and aspirations as economic fact. There is no doubt we are facing a decade of risk-aversion, where a policy-psychology of caution will entail a strategic neglect of anything outside the perceived ‘core’ services of the cultural economy, and whose products can be valorized and measured by standardised templates. A sense of intellectual mission is needed. We can become trapped in the national default pragmatics of survival, or equally, fashionable cultural theories of no-way-out anti-capitalism.

The Creative City gambit was that policy-making (both urban and cultural) could develop out of the dynamics of complex urban change (even crisis) – that collapsing the distinction between cultural production and urban development, artists, consultants, researchers and policymakers should all be involved in a creative-political process of city-based transformation. This vision was, by the late 1990s, co-extensive with the increase in political devolution, European regionalism and New Labour’s New Localism, but never received the intellectual attention it needed in cultural policy circles. It required a re-thinking of ‘the arts’ and urban culture, whereby cultural investment was not merely a national subsidy largely disembodied or detached from its urban context. The principle frame for arts and cultural investment was ‘the city’: cultural policy became a coherent force within city planning, not just a series of related, practical, strategies, all of which in any case doctored versions of national policies. And yet, the New Localism fell foul of New Labour’s increasing
centralisation of power, and the Creative City vision was not sufficiently politicized to create an alternative concept of an independent civic municipality, around which creative actors and a consequent local policy imaginary could develop.

There are, of course, other interesting issues that could be explored on the productive relation between culture and poverty within the context of ‘recessionary economics’. Currently, lots of interesting things are happening with artists simply trying to find a way of being creative without expensive media or objects, or ‘doing it cheaper’, without direct state patronage. There is a move to internet and social media as preferred cultural location; we have pop-up shops, or installations in other provisional spaces, like bankrupt business space in city shopping centres. Many artists are hoping for a ‘capital flight’ from the spaces of retail, echoing the post-industrial vacation of factory space in the 1970s. However, the artist ‘doing it on the cheap’ is not ‘the problematic’ of the post-creative city.

**Cultural policy and urban regeneration**

Between January and July of 2011, a series of seminars took place entitled ‘Creative City Limits’, sponsored by the AHRC and the Commission for Architecture and the Built Environment (CABE), and driven by UCL’s Urban Lab with other key players such as Malcolm Miles from Plymouth University’s School of Architecture, Design and Environment. The project’s introduction will extend our discussion:

‘The credit crunch and accompanying global economic crisis that came to the fore in September 2008 poses significant tests for this creative economic agenda. Arguably the creative city notion has flourished within the context of a long credit-fuelled boom in financial services and real estate. Policy-makers and cultural practitioners have often benefited from, relied on and targeted new forms of upmarket consumption, corporate sponsorship and property-led urban regeneration. The economic downturn and instigation of a new era of fiscal austerity therefore presents significant challenges for the dominant creative agenda of the last 20 years………’

This framework, to come extent at least, presupposes that the principle conditions of ‘creativity’ demand economic prosperity, and the strategic implementation of creativity in urban environments hitherto is embedded within strong corporate interests and capital investment. Given the last two decades, this is indeed credible. Even so, for those who remember the serious recession of the ‘John Major years’ (arguably at least 1989-1993), the
Creative City idea did not simply die or was displaced. In fact, Landry et al. offered a lot of ideas towards developing urban micro-cultures and small-scale large-impact changes, not requiring massive capital investment. And if there is one type of professional who routinely makes above-scale impacts with depleted resources it is surely the artist. However, there are tectonic shifts in the sub-structure of the economy through which the artist works: cities have been increasingly restructured by the forces of global capital, embedded in a range of urban regeneration mechanisms, with little real resistance on the part of creative or even politically left-wing actors.

The European city has witnessed the increase of service-based production, the decline of heavy industry and the negation of public or civic space by consumption, retail and leisure services. Where city centres were open spaces of congregation, protest and celebration, the focus of social interaction has moved to retail centres, often privately owned, in which congregation and public speaking is prohibited. The range of architectural building types is contracting, despite the increasing diversity of decoration or stylistic facades. ‘Gentrification’ has entailed a new social-class based territorialisation of urban residence: families, generations and communities are dispersed according to their ability to invest in single housing units. The rhetoric of national urban regeneration remains New Labour’s emphasis on ‘quality of life’, ‘culture’ and sustainability, but is predicated on increased property values, corporate ownership and large capital investment that radically reduces any sense of form of civic self-determination. In this scenario, it seems that public art is a virtually helpless addition to urban economic process way beyond its orbit of influence.9

While public art’s ‘orbit of influence’ may be negligible, a critical mass of public artists have, internationally, gained unique place-specific experience of how global forces are manifest in local and civic contexts, and further, have gained a unique vantage point in the political-economic conflicts that animate the development of public space and public culture. Many new urban-public artists are ‘art makers’ perhaps only a segment of their time; they are also project, site and contracts manager, events entrepreneur, critic or cultural diplomat negotiating their way through a local politicised policy environment. The planning, evaluation, research, pedagogic and PR dimension of public art’s routine contractual obligations, while often imposed and unwelcome, have nonetheless developed a range of sectoral skills set that surely give it a potential capability within any new public discourse on culture and the city.
A ‘sociology of professions’ study of public art might point out that what was a discrete (and marginal) genre of art called ‘public art’ is now a distinct ‘sector’ with a range of specific capabilities, regulatory frameworks and articulate a set of procedural norms. While this may seem of little consequence, in an historical framework, developing professional sectors built the capacity for agency and identity and facility for representation. While the kind of representation this may entail is as yet undefined, the point here is that public art by virtue of its access to the civic realm is able to stake out a claim simply not possible to the rest of the cultural sector. Public art, given its contexts of operation, carries an intrinsic mandate to represent the ‘public’, something arguably not intrinsic to contemporary art broadly speaking, whatever the nature of their funding obligations.

There is of course a caveat to identifying public art as a ‘sector’, not least as it lacks its own institutionalised spaces. The caveat is that its policy-function has been so heavily defined by, and invested within, objectives that are specific to the capital projects of urban regeneration or the local agenda through which it has been commissioned. In other words, its life as art is not its own: it becomes ‘property’, and to that extent a mediator of another regime of value and meaning. A survey of current local authority public art strategies would find the following terms and rationales for the local commissioning of public art:

- Art as stimulus to economic recovery (as a cultural industry);
- Art as commerce (sub-contracting; merchandising);
- Art as work (e.g. providing temporary employment; internal to leisure/tourism);
- Art as revived local culture (civic life, history, achievement or aspiration);
- Art as ‘investment’ (providing a visible return as added value to public property);
- Art as strategic component in the accumulation of civic cultural assets;
- Art as architecture (articulating buildings).

Up to the early 1980s, the rationales for public art commissioning were still operating with reference to the nationalist romantic humanism that inspired the Arts Council’s Royal Charter of 1946 – exemplary civilization, national patrimony and common heritage, educational self-improvement and the cultivation of national sensibility, and the transhistoric values of enlightened human thought, setting us again on the path to progress. By the late
1980s, the rationales underpinning public art commissioning were reframed with a ‘new economics’ of post-industrial enterprise, with its intangible values, intellectual property and enhancement of a flexible, specialised, globalised labour market. The traditions of English romanticism originally did have an economic dimension – public culture was, to a large degree, funded by philanthropic or industrialist wealth and a general sense of industriousness was a public duty. However, where the ‘public’ dimension was emphatic in the Arts Council’s philosophy of cultural policy, ‘historic public culture’ as a concept largely dissolved, and then with the rise of the irrepressible media, lost also was any sense of culture’s role in the public sphere.

Creating the Creative City

The initial Creative City model developed through the 1980s, wherein public art was still largely civic sculpture or architectural additions, and ‘culture’ largely signified the arts. Intellectually, Landry and Comedia – to some extent influenced by European cultural planning traditions – offered a framework solution to a structural problem that had been endemic to British urban policy since before Harold Wilson’s Urban Programme of the 1960s. Urban development was driven either by policies focused on people (social problems, training, employment, etc.), or policies centred on property (the built environment). This dichotomy was logical, but cities and their inhabitants did not develop according to logic.

Landry envisaged every form of agency being involved in city life and development. Creativity was neither maverick, individualist and capricious, but a new form of democracy and participation. The city was not a ‘platform’ for creative production, but a creative product itself. Art should emerge out of a Creative City, not make a city creative by being imported into it. At the same time, Landry’s city relies both on national policies that would facilitate municipal independence and on locally-generated ideas, enlightened local government, aptitudes and a creative motivation (which, arguably, was never there – a fact encountered in the last decade by both the Urban Task Force and then CABE 11). It became clear that national government or its agencies could not so easily inspire creativity in local context. After the Millennium Dome, the demise of many National Lottery-funded cultural projects, and the perplexing spectacle of ‘The Public’ arts venue in West Bromwich, a pervasive skepticism emerged to the rise of top-down ‘micro-managed culture’. 12 The reigning assumption through the 1990s – the by 2005, at the height of the national urban
regeneration effort – was that landmark facilities and new branded spaces act as catalysts of a new civic cultural life and, in turn, naturally stimulate new forms of economic activity. And while few people would turn their back on the consequent products, impressive as they are – The Sage, Gateshead, or The Lowry Centre, Salford, and so on – it is clear that the ‘cause-effect’ logic of state-sponsored cultural intervention did not articulate a true understanding of how cities actually develop. As Malcolm Miles pointed out, high-cost flagship cultural facilities can certainly stimulate new ways of consuming culture – but not actual cultural production or a real material economy.  

‘Culture-led regeneration’ was a project-based phenomena that probably came closest to Landry’s Creative City development. Particularly through Millennium Commission-driven projects from 1998, for the celebratory year 2000, it provided the most expansive framework of development for public art. Intellectually, its origins are entwined with the Creative City idea, which emerged from the late 1980s with two significant publications: The Arts Council of Great Britain’s *An Urban Renaissance: The Role of the Arts in Urban Regeneration* (1989) and the British and American Arts Association’s *Arts and the Changing City: an agenda for urban regeneration* (1989). These publications both acknowledged the way the traditional (philosophical-aesthetic) way of thinking about ‘the arts’ was not adequate for the role of artistic creativity within broader and rigorous contexts of urban and social planning. Both call for a new conceptual framework for advocacy for arts and culture in urban contexts. By 2004 and the Department of Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS) policy publication *Culture at the Heart of Regeneration* this call had, to a significant extent, been met with a radically expanded public art sector. Although somewhat belated as a response to enormous developments in the urban realm, and selective in its examples (its main categories were cultural icons and landmarks, place-making and urban identity, social and community consolidation), the DCMS document acknowledged an intellectual capability in public art that extended beyond the confines of ‘the arts’ as previously conceived.

What is interesting about *Culture at the Heart of Regeneration* was that it came late enough to register some of the disappointments of culture-led urban regeneration – for example, it stated: ‘Transformation must happen in response to local needs… If regeneration is imposed from the “top down”, it won’t work’. It further noted that the ‘Bilbao effect’ of the Guggenheim Museum was fading, and will continue to do so if not more securely embedded in its urban environment and a developmental process of change that involved ‘quality of life, social cohesion, regional identity or governance’.
In the concluding third of this paper I will attempt to outline the various roles public art played for urban regeneration policy by way of assessing its future potential for city-urban development after the decline of the Creative City ideal. The recent history of urban policy is still very much a living history, as the rhetoric of New Labour is still politically embedded in local authority political life. New Labour-era urban policy guidelines, objectives and strategic frameworks are still in use: documents like the DCMS *Culture at the Heart of Regeneration* of 2004 is still an important reference point for city-level public art strategy, as is the even earlier Department of Environment, Transport and the Regions’ Urban White Paper, *Our Towns and Cities – The Future* (of 2000), along with its ancillary document *By Design. Urban Design in the Planning System* (also of 2000).17

Below I identify the civic ‘roles’ created by urban policy for public art – and this will, in turn, bring us to our central issues: what intellectual and cultural management resources does public art possess that will enable it to set down an agenda for the post-Creative City era? After the Creative City, can we envisage a Public City? Against the Big Society, can we imagine a Big Public? How can ‘culture’ (as in the cultural sector), play a part in the Public Sphere (or, in the absence of a genuine public sphere, begin to model a new public sphere, of unfettered participation and representation of the true diversity of life, belief and values in particular spaces and places).

I suggested that public art's urban policy appropriation inadvertently developed a range of roles and sectoral-like capabilities. These roles offered public art practice a certain access to important dimensions of city development and the discourses that animate its political constitution and governance. These roles may, on the face of it, look routine. However, looking at them as cultural discourse, as part of the crucial task of using ideas and theories to develop a policy imaginary, I suggest that public art has the facility to make the primary cultural contribution to other political-urban forces demanding a new concept of the city. The roles are: *urban re-design and aesthetic reorientation of urban space; the reconstruction of civic identities; the simulation of collective participation in urban governance; public art as media of social engagement and development; and lastly, public art as mechanism for articulating political legitimacy (the necessity of state sponsorship of public culture)*. In a broader study we would need to give examples from across the UK; here I can only offer a commentary on the way specific policy contexts set down these ‘roles’, and what key questions they generate.
Public art has participated in the process of transforming the aesthetics and symbolic meanings of civic centres across the country, even though for the most part its creative potential has been curtailed by the primacy of urban planning and architecture as shapers of civic space. However, after New Labour’s accession in 1997, the rise of urban design as a dimension of urban policy was a significant advance for artists in the public realm, overcoming the limitations of the previous regime of traditional British town planning allied with local authority town management. From the establishment of the Urban Task Force in 1998, the establishment of CABE, the continued work of national regeneration agency English Partnerships and the increasing attention to design in national planning statements, by 2004 the attention to the aesthetics and structural integrity of the urban environment became a political imperative for local authorities. Through this period (in fact, stretching back the Thatcher government’s response to European planning law and practice of the 1980s), public art saw the appearance of a stream of important publications in the form of strategy documents, commissioning guidelines and social studies of public art in context. This witnessed the professionalisation of public art consultants and agents as well as local authorities now considering public art as a legitimate object of a city’s hardware.

The spectrum of urban policies relating to design, construction, public buildings and open spaces was impressive, and even now are still useful as future resources. However, one thing is clear: as enlightened as the urban-design driven regeneration was, it was still property-driven, planning dominated and, whatever its virtues, it exhibits only a basic empirical grasp of the aesthetics and phenomenology of social space. Further, as the many city masterplans since 2006 demonstrated, there was no real development in the theoretical understanding of the relation between public culture and public space beyond traditional understandings of pedestrianism, civic memorialisation and celebratory events. Masterplanning, while admirable in its attempt to address the historic English traditions of incrementalism and laissez-faire planning permissions, were often dictatorial and ‘straight-jacket’ in their limiting of future change or public usage. There have been few mechanisms for translating urban research into policy and creative practice, and at local policy level the urban masterplan was either a simplified version of national exemplars (such as CABE’s *By Design*) or a set of piecemeal additions, where a given city could be host to half a dozen different regeneration projects, all ostensibly fitted together like a jigsaw puzzle. All too often, public artists found themselves reduced to adding an element of visual stimulation to
urban enclaves or parts of cities whose urban space was not subject to thorough research and planning with the latest available theoretical resources. How can public art extend its research capabilities and challenge theoretical norms in local authority planning practice, and make public alternate models of the space-place-citizen nexus? How has the orthodoxy of ‘mixed-development’ and multiculturalism actually built in socio-aesthetic alienation and worked against the development of a pluralist public space? How can public space be built around the experience of public interaction and participation and not socio-economic functions and their building design-styles?

(ii) Reconstructing civic identities:

The Labour Party’s manifesto for the 1997 general election stated: ‘The arts, culture and sport are central to the task of recreating the sense of community, identity and civic pride that should define our country. Yet we consistently undervalue the role of the arts and culture in helping to create a civic society’. The rise of civic identity as an issue in national urban policy through the 1990s was one that dovetailed with four developments: political movement to devolution (both national and city-based); political attentiveness to ethnic and cultural identities (minority rights and multiculturalism); the European Core Cities and related initiatives, making cities a new focus of political investment; and the rise of city branding and destination marketing for a global tourist economy rapidly expanding. Add to this the new policy research in the creative and cultural industries, the city was redefined as ‘an economy’ in its own right. There appeared a subsequent raft of new urban policy statements on the city, such as the Urban White Paper of 2000 (Our Towns and Cities: The Future), along with the new State of the English Cities project, which started the same year, and continues.

Civic spaces within the major UK cities were increasingly enlivened by a confluence of economic forces, each with their own agenda, from city marketing to aspirations to create creative or cultural quarters. Traditionally, civic identity was historical, substantial, enduring and cumulative, and collectively achieved through using local resources. Civic identity was now something to be recreated through new indicators of economic performance combined with education and social ‘wellbeing’ (under policy priorities, a flexible labour market). Commissioned public artists usually found themselves enrolled in one or other of a city’s new economic expansion regimes: to boost the visitor economy; to upgrade local social skills; to contribute to gentrification for a new incoming professional class; or simply to add
to the new symbolic expressions of civic expansion and confidence. The research and statutory weight of government bodies like the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister’s Social Exclusion Unit after 1997, and particularly its assertive Social Exclusion Task Force, ensured that new urban policy initiatives made measured to integrate economic development indicators with social and neighbourhood factors (from education to security to quality of open spaces). Yet Blair’s initial broader picture, on how to create a ‘civic society’ or a civic culture, could not emerge from the panoply of initiatives, agencies and agendas that animated city life – the relation between social communities and culture, urban memory and historical development, civic and public interaction, became incoherent. In May of 2010, the Coalition Government created a new Office for Civil Society (OCS) in the Cabinet Office. The ‘Big Society’ concept is a response to this situation, but the vision of society it articulates is beginning to look like the classic free-market economists model of a ‘civil society’ – a platform of competing private, corporate and institutional (non-profit) interests, with little sense of a cohesive ‘public good’ beyond charity. How can public art set about identifying the misalignments of civil, civic and public, reconstructing an historical sense of the social without recourse to the past narratives of nationalistist unity. The symbolic language of the ‘civic’ became problematic in the 1980s with the rise of a multi-ethnic population: city brand was the soft, if provisional, option. How do we design civic identity without the constantly changing signifiers of the market? This is not a marketing project, but a social one, at once mediates the concealed political contradictions of the current political settlement of cities, and offering a competing model of civic life without expensive buildings. Our sense of common ownership needs redefining for a post-welfarist era.

(iii) Collective participation in urban governance:

Urban governance (originally an American concept) loomed large during the era of New Labour ‘initiatives’, schemes and new public agencies. The now defunct Regional Development Agencies (RDAs), the Urban Regeneration Companies (supplanting the old Urban Development Corporations (UDCs), many of which survive), the New Commitment to Regeneration scheme, and the list could continue, all played a role in a well demarcated field that is now under post-New Labour political reconstruction. Many of these developments involved the creation of new decision-making institutional arrangements, especially at area-based level, ostensibly making more ‘democratic’ urban governance by spreading decision-making well outside the orbit of the local authority. However, it seems that ‘governance’, as a public-political issue, was eclipsed by a new intensive field of
competitive influence and impressive panoply of otherwise disjointed urban projects. All local authorities arguably suffer from the fate of the incomplete project that began with the DETR statement *Modern Local Government: In Touch with the People* and subsequent Local Government Act of 2000.\textsuperscript{25} ‘Local democracy’ remains national government writ small, with all its short-termist fiscal management and limiting ideological allegiances, giving city councils neither the power to create a fully functioning localised public sphere nor to aspire to specific long-term fully integrated urban transformation. The only real long-term planning possible (as in a city’s 25 year Unitary Development Plan) has been hard physical infrastructure and land-use. The new Localism Act (November, 2011) is aimed at changing that, but only through relaxing direct control and not allowing city-level restructuring of local democracy.

The relation between representation, participation and civic life is at the heart of public art, and as far as urban policy did indeed change urban governance, the area is still a field of major questions. The stakeholder idea that Blair had promoted since 1994 has its current reincarnation in the Big Society of the Coalition government, yet still operating under New Labour rhetoric of social inclusion and Third Sector empowerment. Its purpose is to set out a sense of collective duty, responsibility and ownership for the mechanisms of urban reproduction.\textsuperscript{26} Arguably, we have less the model of urban governance envisaged by the Local Government Act than a political administration of resource management. Public artists on large projects have a unique experience of the truncated processes of local democracy, along with its similarly disjunctive and over-regulated arenas of city space. They also know the power of dialogue, action and the participatory power of local narrative-creation outside the narrow corridors of local government offices. New processes and discursive streams need cultivating, where the energy, volatility and conflict of real social life is registered in the official thought processes that are finally manifest in the built environment. In the UK, we are still lacking public spaces, in part as we lack a socially convincing concept of public space beyond civic congregation, events or leisure. How can a public space be created that plays a role in the formation of political will, beyond the usual city-based interest groups? Where are the advocates of a common public culture, involving vernacular creativity and outside the usual realms of historic institutions?

**(iv) Media of social engagement and development:**

Working in urban environments so replete with political aspiration, Public art could hardly
resist becoming inculcated. Whatever ‘independent’ aesthetic objectives motivated an individual work of public art, the cognitive conditions of creative practice were set down at the outset by a vigorous social engagement-driven public policy. New Labour’s concept of culture, which has not yet been politically re-engineered by the present Coalition Government, was arguably fourfold. First, there featured a quasi-anthropological-cum-social notion of our ‘way of life’, which demanded that policy be attentive to social well-being and ‘quality of life’ (the latter term becoming a big urban policy concept); second, culture is the arts (exemplified if not dominated by national arts institutions); third, the creative industries (which, policy-wise, were half-culture and half-trade and industry); fourth, socially-applied culture (everything creative in urban or social contexts). Specific policy fields attended to the second and third of these; the fourth we will address in a moment. The first came to animate a lot of social and urban policy, perhaps first appearing in the 1999 command paper *A Better Quality of Life: A Strategy for Sustainable Development in the UK* (DETR), then in other contexts, like later Audit Commission’s Quality of Life Indicators, starting in 2002.\(^{27}\)

The term ‘quality of life’ peppered so many political speeches on urban development between 2002-6 and yet its notional content became so tabulated within a series of sustainability objectives, any conception of cultural lifestyle — its historicity, urban aesthetics and ethical structure — became irrelevant.

‘Socially-applied culture’ (if we can call it that) was subject to some major political capital investment, to the extent that even the arts and historic arts institutions became liable for social policy objectives. New Labour’s political pluralism and multiculturalism was aggressively enforced to the point where noncompliance made one either an elitist, racist or simply disqualified for public subsidy. The result was a raft of measures ensuring social and cultural access for diverse social constituencies, whether the art or culture was specifically relevant to them or not. Public art, by its nature, was immersed in this ideological development: the spectrum of social activity that needed to be tabulated and weighed could stretch from general assessments of community involvement and development, to individual and inter-personal development, poverty and social status, crime and security, health and general well-being, travel and access.

DCMS’s 2001 *Social Inclusion Action Plan* dovetailed with the Social Exclusion Unit’s National Strategy Action Plan, *A New Commitment to Neighbourhood Renewal* (Cabinet Office, 2001), and in the context of the 2002 Local Government Act were obligated to abolish the idea of stand-alone cultural or arts strategies and place them within the context
of the new emerging policy discourse of communities. In 2002, the new cultural monitoring
body QUEST assessed the achievements of the DCMS in this regard (highlighted in the
Executive Summary of their report *Making it Count*). The DCMS-published report, *Leading
the Good Life: Guidance on Integrating Cultural and Community Strategies* (2004), became
the more insistent basis for local authorities re-contextualising cultural resources within
community-neighbourhood and social strategy. Where once economic instrumentalism
subsumed the relative autonomy of culture in the mechanisms of business and industry,
there emerged an irrepressible *social instrumentalism*.  

By 2004, it seemed that every public art project by political fiat had to include the poor, minorities, children and the
disabled (this in turn generated a corresponding right-wing caricature).

Possessing the experience of working in the liminal spaces between diverse social
constituencies, local authorities and cultural institutions, the public artist is in a unique
position to reconfigure the terms by which social value is created, and to reposition the
emphasis on civic involvement and urban public culture rather than social value per se. How
can public art replace the political imperatives of ‘socially-applied culture’ with more explicit
values of public culture in specific civic contexts? How can public art demonstrate a greater
intellectual empowerment and cultural capital for ordinary people beyond that available in
standardised art-enhanced social-community cohesion mechanisms? What was often
missing from the ‘social’ dimension of art’s application was the more fundamental aesthetic
or cognitive-ethical development. Social access to cultural services and cultural education
was so framed by questions of identity and national belonging, the question of real cultural
citizenship became opaque. Concealed also was the individual’s ability to experience their
own radical individuality, to think through their own socially-determined intellectual state,
and engage in a philosophical appraisal of their own journey through life in this globalised
world.

**(v)** *Culture as visual field of political legitimacy:*

In a country where the borders between populism and democracy are permeable, an
emphasis on public benefit so easily flips into popular consumption, with the latter an all too
useful political tool. There was no contradiction in New Labour’s imperious approach to
government and a near obsession with mechanisms of accountability, that is, a lack of
democracy in central government *required* the effective smokescreen of complex evaluation
and monitoring regimes in local government, NDPBs and other public agencies. Public
accountability was a means of policy control; as an ideology, public accountability (and the so-called ‘audit culture’ it spawned) shifted the burden for democratic proof from the state and onto a public. The overlap – if not confusion – between ‘public’ and ‘state’ is of course endemic to Britain’s historic parliamentary democracy. It also signals a pattern of domination-subservience endemic in British cultural life.

A crisis in the political philosophy of public life emerged in various ways during the decade, with one interesting moment from 2004-5 where the obsession with public accountability was beginning to strangle cultural initiatives. The DCMS statement Better Places to Live (2005), and its predecessor statement Government and the Value of Culture (2004), which was an odd if poignant personal essay by Culture Minister Tessa Jowell, a decisive contribution to what later became known as the ‘public value debates’. In both these papers, and against the growing influence of HM Treasury’s Public Service Agreement Framework (the PSA, which demanded thorough value performance indicators applied to all public spending), senior government figures argued for the ‘intrinsic’ value of culture. This was made more explicit by the later ACE-sponsored McMaster Review: Supporting Excellence in the Arts – from measurement to judgement (2008). The criteria of ‘judgement’ (i.e. ostensibly where the terms of value were defined by the professional constituency of any given sector) was earlier being promulgated by think tank DEMOS. John Holden’s influential essay Capturing Cultural Value: How culture has become a tool of government policy (DEMOS, 2004) went some way to set out the problem beyond the templates derived from American New Public Management practices adopted by New Labour. Of specific issue was the government’s commitment to ‘smart’ target setting (where sponsored projects meet smart criteria: Specific, Measurable, Achievable, Relevant, and Time-bound), as set down in the HM Treasury’s seminal Green Book. Audit culture extended throughout local authority service provision, including culture (with DMCS’s Best Value Performance Indicators (BVPI) for local cultural services). Tabulating smart target-hitting became one of the major headache’s for public artists.

The demand for evidence-based evaluation in the cultural sector was problematic all round – philosophically as well as practically. It can be understood in two ways: in public policy terms, subject-specific evidence along with a data capturing sectoral capability is a strong legitimacy mechanism through which the cultural sector specifically could claim a much desired ‘independence’ as a distinct policy field. Culture would thus not remain subservient to evaluation or funding models develop for other unrelated policy areas. However,
evidence-based evaluation also became a process of institutionalised surveillance and self-censorship. It is impossible to know just how far it became embedded in the cognitive contexts of cultural creativity that it was a formative influence on the very processes of idea-formulation and experience of public space. Whether this is, or is not, a detrimental process, is something that requires on-site research, the resources and time for which are rarely provided in public commissions themselves. How does our public space embody the bureaucratic rationality that is so far from the real fissures of social life? How has the state supplanted the public, as the owner of public space and how can we retrieve it for developing a non-state patronized socio-public culture? In this, how can public art explore the relation between policy mechanisms of value and evaluation and the creative process from idea-formulation to public engagement?

**Conclusion**

My objective in summarising the recent history of public art’s urban policy appropriation is not just to show how Labour’s ‘social instrumentalism’, combined with culture-led urban regeneration, positioned it firmly within other political agendas. It is through the experience of policy appropriation that public art developed an extraordinary range of reference and professional capability. Considering this history raises some interesting questions, which in turn provoke some ideas on public art’s own possible ‘public’ agenda. While public art is not a unified artistic practice, with established forms of professional representation (unlike architecture, media, or acting and theatre) it does, at least potentially, have a unifying principle in its ‘public’ mandate. Internal to public art and its history in civic monuments and commemorative sculpture is an engagement with the symbolic language of civic power, public interest and cultural identity (whether the nation state, local city municipality, multi-ethnic Europe or global citizenship), and this has been very useful to cities and their strategic use of culture.

The Creative City, above all, was a vision for a public city. It was so enchanted with how creativity could make cities more exciting and vibrant places that it neglected to develop the political potential of creativity. Yet the idea lives on – art and creative practice is a model and leader for urban development. Public art can be such a catalyst for developing models of urban change, grounded as it is in the politics of urban space. It is not simply ‘artists working in the public realm’, but the space of cities define a distinct realm of cultural production and action, quite separate from mainstream contemporary art. Mainstream
contemporary artists – particularly art world ‘celebrities’ – will always exploit the public realm as a giant exhibition space, with all its PR as well as its artistic potential. But public art has become much more than art objects in civic space – it is about the public function of that space.

My conclusion can only appeal to extending the specific sense in which the term ‘public’ presents public art with a mission, and with every mission, demands a political philosophy. The work of Eric Corijn in Brussels (and the COSMOPOLIS City, Culture and Society research team) is of particular interest in this context. Corijn’s assessment of the way democracy in European national states has become compromised by outmoded systems of national political representation, global markets, as well as changing demographics, is instructive. Calling for a new realignment of global and local in the city-based ‘new urban republic’, he observes the way that the European economies will only develop if serious political capital is invested in city cultures (and cities take on governance responsibilities for both themselves and their regions). Cities are becoming the new ‘media’ of globalisation, where national governments are becoming more impotent, and the knowledge of cities, urban life and the political potential of public culture is becoming more potent in developing new and vital post-national spaces of production. And while a European Union emphasis on ‘cities and regions’ has been around for decades (as well as successive drives for a ‘new localism’), what drives Corijn’s research is a cultural-urban policy-led new public realm, relevant to us.

The new urban republic, like the Creative City, is a project and a process, which public art is suitably able to advance in the context of the Coalition Government’s emerging political discourse of decentralisation and devolution. It is a framework in which public art can re-articulate its policy-driven knowledge base, intellectual and professional capabilities. The concept of the new urban republic suggests that public art can become a prime driver in the call for urban democracy through radical political devolution. Where nation states as coherent cultural entities are being pulled apart by the twin forces of European integration and globalisation, a new re-grounding in the ‘real’ economies of city productivity, as well as a political re-alignment of urban centres, national and European-wide governance, is needed. This is not principally a task for political ideology and its vested interests, but a public project, necessitating a connection of urban publics across cities, demanding extreme imagination, calling for a intellectual vision of a Creative City worth working for.
Notes


5: See the various cultural sector responses on the proposals for the National Planning Policy Framework (NPPF), which initially did not include a reference to ‘culture’. http://ixia-info.com/research/the-planning-system-and-process/ (accessed 10/01/12).

Walsall: Supplementary Planning Document for Urban Design, Walsall City Council; Plymouth 2020 Local Strategic Partnership (2009) The Vital Spark: A cultural strategy for the city of Plymouth 2009-2020, Plymouth City Council. There are a number of current Creative City projects in the UK, but like ‘Creative City Birmingham’ are Local Enterprise Partnership (LEP) schemes, only involving parts of the city, and with no specific claim on urban governance or aims to stimulate the city’s public sphere.


8: See weblink at note 2.


13: Miles has made this argument in many publications; for one, see Miles (2005) at note 9 above.


16: Document un paginated; quotes on p.5 (in the section ‘Organic development’ of the Executive Summary) and p.14.


26: For an interesting perspective on the origin and fate of Tony Blair’s ‘stakeholder society’ doctrine, see Paul Seaman: http://paulseaman.eu/2010/04/wither-stakeholder-doctrine/


